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Abstract: 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between various measures of intangible capital and the 
market valuation of young biopharmaceutical firms. We employ a non-linear model to measure 
the impact of R&D, patents, alliances, organizational capital, and mergers on the value of 349 
newly-incorporated firms between 1980 and 2006. We find that, with the exception of mergers, 
our measures of intangible capital have positive and significant effects on market values; the impact 
of R&D declines as firms mature; and the omission of either alliances or organizational capital 
leads to a significant overstatement of the influence of R&D.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The valuation of firms in technology-based industries is among the most challenging tasks 
in finance. Despite considerable research efforts over the last three decades,1 a substantial 
unexplained differential remains between book and market values (Amir and Lev, 1996). Various 
studies point to a failure to account for intangible assets, rather than “mismeasurement of 
conventional equity or the vicissitudes of the stock market,” (Hulten and Hao, 2008, p. 1) as the 
primary source of this differential. Valuing intangible assets of young technology-based firms, 
which typically derive the bulk of their value from such assets, is “notoriously difficult” (Guo et 
al., 2005, p. 3). Prime examples of this, and the focus of our study, are newly-incorporated 
biopharmaceutical firms, which invest heavily in intangibles2 and have impressive track records 
with respect to innovation. We analyze the relationship between R&D-based intangibles and the 
value of young firms3 where information asymmetries are particularly acute and financial 
information is of limited value.4  
We use a market value function based on hedonic Tobin’s Q equations first introduced by 
Griliches (1981).5 This is the standard approach used in the literature to test the influence of 
various measures of intangible assets on firm performance using stock market data. We expand 
the standard version of the value function to include additional terms, capturing several intangibles 
that are unique to the biopharmaceutical industry and for which data are publicly available. In 
                                                          
1 Numerous studies have explored this relationship. Examples include Griliches (1981), Cockburn and Griliches 
(1988), Hall (1993), Lev (2001), Chan et al. (2001), Hall et al. (2005), among others.  
2 The biopharmaceutical sector is one of the most R&D-intensive in the United States, with companies investing more 
than 12 times the amount of R&D per employee than all manufacturing industries overall; see Phrma.org, 2017 State 
of the Industry (http://phrma.org/industryprofile/)  
3 During the first 12 years after their incorporation. 
4 Although prior studies have investigated the impact of various intangibles on firm value, we consider the impact of 
several intangibles simultaneously with the goal of parsing out the different effects. Related works include: 
Trajtenberg (1990) demonstrates that patents are important for optical scanners; Megna and Mueller (1991) find that 
advertising is an important source of intangible capital in the distilled beverage and cosmetic industries; Megna and 
Klock (1993) and Shane and Klock (1997) show that R&D expenditures and citation-weighted patent metrics measure 
intangible capital in the semiconductor industry, respectively; Chan et al. (1997) and Filson and Oweis (2010) show 
that alliance formation has a positive impact on the value of biotech firms; Klock and Megna (2000) demonstrate that 
spectrum license data can be used as a metric of intangible capital of cell phone companies; Rzahkanov (2004) shows 
that advertising and clinical trials are important in the biotech industry; Darby, Liu and Zucker (2004) study the value 
of R&D, citations and human capital in biotech; Filson (2004) examines the impacts of advertising and promotional 
alliances on the value of young e-commerce firms; Gleason and Klock (2006) show that advertising is also important 
in the pharmaceutical and chemical industry; Hulten and Hao (2008) study the impact of organizational development 
on the market value of a sample of pharmaceutical firms; and Gupta et al. (2017) analyze the relationship between 
market value and firm investments in customer acquisitions and customer service.   
5 Other examples of this approach can be found in: Cockburn and Griliches (1988), Megna and Klock (1993), Klock 
et al. (1996), Shane and Klock (1997), Klock and Megna (2000), Hall et al. (2000), and Hall et al. (2005).    
selecting our intangible asset measures, we work under the premise that any outlay intended to 
increase future rather than current revenues should be considered a capital investment (as in 
Corrado et al., 2006). Therefore, spending on R&D, new patents, and even improved 
organizational structures should, in principle, be counted as investment.  
A general consensus exists in the literature that R&D conducted by firms is an input in the 
production process whose output is an intangible asset.6 R&D is especially critical in the 
biopharmaceutical industry according to Filson et al. (2015). To measure the R&D output, most 
studies have used the number of patent applications a firm has filed, weighted by the number of 
citations those patents receive to adjust for their quality, and thus economic value.7 Patent 
information has limitations however—it measures knowledge output at the end of the discovery 
stage and at the beginning of a potential product development. In a great majority of cases however, 
patented inventions do not even enter the product development stage, and of those that do, 
relatively few are developed into final marketable products.8 For this reason, it is important to test 
the impact of another measure of R&D success, namely the clinical pipeline9 that tracks 
pharmaceutical product development through a number of well-defined stages and which is a 
strong indicator of a firm’s future cash flows10 (see Sharma and Lacey, 2004; McNamara and 
Fuller, 2007).  
Given the significance of R&D expenditures in the biopharmaceutical industry, an 
important question concerns the relationship between a firm’s age and the value of its R&D 
investment. In the fast-changing technology-based industries, the fit between a firm’s innovative 
                                                          
6 Numerous studies have shown that R&D expenditures have a large impact on the market value of firms (Hall et al., 
2005 and others). 
7 The large-scale use of patent data in economic research goes back to Scherer (1965), Schmookler (1966), and 
Griliches (1984). Prior literature shows that quality-adjusted patents do seem to add information above and beyond 
that obtained from R&D input measures (see Trajtenberg, 1990; and, Hall et al., 2000, 2005)  
8 An average of four years from beginning discovery research to beginning human clinical trials involving thousands 
of rejected compounds, and an average of eight years from beginning human clinical trials to introducing a new 
approved drug with an approximately one-in-five chance of success (Filson et al., 2015). 
9 In order for a company to market a product, it has to be approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA). The 
process involves different phases: The first one is the Pre-Clinical studies. Then, it files an Investigational New Drug 
Application with the FDA (IND). If approved, then it goes to clinical trials. There are three clinical trials: Phase I, 
Phase II and Phase III. If a drug passes all of the three clinical trials, then a firm files a New Drug Application (NDA). 
If the application is approved by the Board of Review, then it can commercialize the drug. 
10 Besides increasing the likelihood of increased future sales, successful clinical trials also create positive externalities 
that are valuable to the firm. The firm’s experience with product development and its familiarization with a myriad of 
regulations that govern it, can create positive spillovers to the development of other products and further future sales. 
These spillovers increase the firm’s capabilities in product development which at the same time raises the likelihood 
of profiting from more products in the market (Danzon et al., 2005).  
infrastructure and the current technological environment is critical to the success of the firm. In 
principle, the impact of age on R&D quality can be either positive or negative. Older firms have 
more experience and might benefit from economies of scale and/or scope, for example. At the 
same time, the more mature firms may suffer from overinvestment11 and also from having more 
entrenched R&D programs, both of which increase the likelihood that their innovative output 
becomes mismatched with current market demands. In the latter case, age, experience, and 
accumulated competencies can be a burden for firms as they try to adapt to, or develop, new 
technologies (Henderson and Clark 1990; Henderson 1993). Furthermore, in recent decades there 
has been a tight link between scientific discovery and new products—new firms have often been 
spinouts from universities formed by star scientists to exploit the latest scientific discoveries. This 
has tended to provide an edge for young/small firms.12  
Despite large investments in R&D, numerous observers have pointed to dwindling 
prospects for new drug discoveries and a wave of pending patent expirations as a major concern 
for the biopharmaceutical industry. This has forced firms to supplement their internal R&D with 
external sources of innovation, such as strategic technology alliances, and to gain R&D synergies 
through acquisitions (see Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; Danzon et al., 2007; Grabowski and Kyle, 
2008). Both alliances and acquisitions enable companies to quickly access technological assets 
(Lerner et al., 2003), to expand their knowledge base, and to exploit their existing technological 
edge (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). Unlike acquisitions however, in an industry where projects 
are particularly uncertain, risky, long, and expensive, alliances provide flexibility and are relatively 
cheap to set up (Filson and Morales, 2006). Firms can experiment by creating alliances with 
different partners and disband them quickly if warranted by changes in the market conditions. If a 
firm instead choses the acquisition route, then it “is able to grow quickly, but it shrinks with great 
difficulty as resources come under managerial control” (Chan et al., 1997, p. 203). A misevaluation 
of the target firm by an acquirer can therefore be very costly for the firm. Given the importance of 
alliances and M&As in the biopharmaceutical industry, we test for their respective impacts on 
market value.13  
                                                          
11 This according to the life-cycle hypothesis (see Grabowski and Mueller, 1975). 
12 Darby et al. (1999) analyze the role of star scientists on the market value of biotechnology firms. 
13 Several papers have looked at post-merger firm performance including Filson et al. (2015) who find that post-
merger R&D intensity varies across a sample of pharmaceutical firms; Danzon et al. (2007) show that merging firms 
experience a slower growth and lower operating profits. In an authoritative study, Chan et al. (1997) conclude that 
Our final intangible metric tracks investments in organizational capital. Similar to R&D 
and other intangibles, spending on a new management system, employee training, marketing 
and/or sales teams seeks to improve the financial performance of a firm and should therefore be 
considered an investment.14 We use firms’ selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses 
as a proxy for their investment in organizational capital.15 According to Hulten and Hao (2008), 
“at least a fraction of such expenditures should be treated as capital for accounting purposes” (p. 
13). The difficulty in measuring this variable has led economists to typically account for it by using 
fixed effects. However, the more recent literature (including Corrado et al., 2006; Hulten and Hao, 
2008; Peters and Taylor, 2017) provides guidance on the measurement issues. 
Our main findings indicate that a host of intangible assets—R&D, the patent portfolio, 
technology alliances, and organizational capital—have a positive and significant influence on the 
market value of young biopharmaceutical firms. R&D investments display diminishing returns: as 
firms age, they get less bang for their R&D buck. We find that the M&A activity mostly has an 
insignificant influence on the market value of the acquirers’ shares. Lastly, our results show that 
the omission of either technology alliances or organizational capital leads to a substantial 
overstatement of the importance of R&D. These findings demonstrate the merit of investigating 
this topic at a granular level—the results otherwise may be seriously misleading due to omitted 
variables. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II presents the econometric 
specification; in section III we construct the different measures of intangible capital and describe 
the data sources; section IV discusses the results of the model; finally, section V summarizes the 
main conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
firms that enter into an alliance improve their operating performance (in the five-year period surrounding the event), 
and that technical alliances trigger a stronger, positive response from equity investors.  
14 Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2002) and Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2005) illustrate the case of corporations’ 
investments in information technology during the 1990s, which were intended to increase the effectiveness of their 
management. Bloom and Van Reenan (2007) provide evidence that these investments increased the value of a 
company. Black and Lynch (2005) report similar results for investments in worker training. 
15 Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) argue that the SG&A expense includes most of the expenditures that generate 
organization capital. 
II. Methodology and Estimation 
 
In the market value model, the firm is treated as a set of tangible and intangible assets 
where the marginal shadow value of its assets is measured by the hedonic price of the firm. The 
value function is: 
 
 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   =  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖 , . . .𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) (1) 
 
where 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the value of firm i at time t. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denote the various tangible 
and intangible assets of firm i at time t. 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the current market value coefficient of the firm: 
 
 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) (2) 
 
where  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 is the firm-specific effect, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is the time effect, and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an individual disturbance term. 
To estimate the econometric model, we assume that the firm’s assets are additively separable (as 
in Hall, 1990): 
 
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   =  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 [𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   + (𝛽𝛽)𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]𝜎𝜎 (3) 
 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents tangible assets of the firm, β is the relative shadow price of intangible assets, 
and 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a measure of intangible assets. After assuming constant returns to scale (𝜎𝜎 = 1), and 
dividing by Ait, we have: 
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
  =  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  �1  +  𝛽𝛽 �𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�� (4) 
Lastly, defining Tobin’s Q as  𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and taking logs, we get: 
 
 log𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = log 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + log �1 +  𝛽𝛽 �𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖��  (5) 
 
Hall et al. (2005) explain that theory is not clear about: (i) the way intangibles (Kit) should 
be specified, and (ii) the effects of intangibles on market value. The process of value creation in 
the biopharmaceutical industry is complex as it depends on intangibles that allow a firm to signal 
success, to appropriate its returns, and to enable them to carry out a successful innovation process. 
We assume that the innovation process occurs when firms combine their tangible assets with 
multiple knowledge assets. Each intangible influences market value differently, however. R&D 
expenses, for instance, have an effect on value by signaling commitment to the core activities of 
biopharmaceutical firms. Patent portfolio size and quality, on the other hand, influence the 
performance a firm’s shares by providing information to investors on the status of knowledge 
production and the synergies and economies of scale created by that knowledge. The number of 
drug candidates going through clinical trials indicates a firm’s success in moving from discovery 
to development and closer to a possible product. Alliances and M&As have an effect on value by 
signaling that a firm is enhancing or expanding its technological capabilities and exploiting 
possible synergies through external technology. And lastly, a firm’s investments in the 
development of its management systems and its employees will likely lead to a better-run, and thus 
more valuable, organization. We assume the investors take into account these pieces of information 
as they assign a value to a firm. With this in mind, we estimate the following equation using a non-
linear least squares model: 
 log𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + log �1 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛼𝛼2  𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1  +  𝛼𝛼3  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛼𝛼4 𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂.𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼5 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶.𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛼𝛼6 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛼𝛼7 𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � +  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
(6) 
In equation (6), 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,⁄  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ , and 𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄  represent measures of 
knowledge and network stocks, namely stocks of R&D, technology alliances, and M&As, 
weighted by assets. 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1⁄  and  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴.𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄  are stocks of patents and drug 
candidates in clinical trials weighted by the 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 stock.16 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄  is a measure of patent 
portfolio quality. Finally, 𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂.𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄  represents our measure of a firm’s investment in 
organizational capital. 
III. Data and Measures 
 
Our sample consists of all firms incorporated between 1980 and 2006 and whose primary 
4-digit Standard Industrial Code (SIC) involves the biopharmaceutical industry (SIC 2834 and 
2836). The sample of firms and the financial statement data for the first 12 years after their initial 
                                                          
16 To construct the patent yield, we divide the patent stock by the first lag of R&D stock because most of the effect of 
R&D on patenting occurs in the first year (see Hall et al., 1986). 
public offering (IPO) is collected from Compustat. The first available fiscal year in Compustat is 
assumed to be the year of the IPO. We collect information on patents, including application year, 
and year of citations, from the 2006 edition of the NBER database described by Hall et al. (2001)17 
and the U.S. Patent Office (USPTO). Alliance and clinical trials data are obtained by searching the 
Thomson Reuters Recap IQ Deal Builder and Development Optimizer databases, which track 
biopharma deals and drug development progress, respectively. 
To ensure that we are focusing on the right firms, we further refine the sample by keeping 
only those firms that S&P’s Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) places in the 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology & Life Sciences industry. Because of our interest in the value 
of clinical trials, we drop firms whose business description mentions animal health. Our next 
refinement drops those firms that have no Recap IQ Deal Builder record. To keep our focus in 
small firms, we drop the firms whose annual revenue exceeds $100 million in the first three years 
after incorporation. Lastly, we drop those observations where R&D or employee information is 
missing. The final sample is an unbalanced panel of 349 firms. Basic statistics for the main 
variables used in the study are reported in Table 1. 
Our dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the market 
value of a firm’s financial claims to the replacement cost of its assets. To construct the Q ratio, we 
follow Erickson and Whited (2006) and calculate the market value of the firm as the sum of total 
assets and market value of equity18 minus the sum of the book value of equity and deferred taxes, 
all adjusted for inflation.19 We use the book value of total assets as a proxy for the replacement 
cost of assets.20 The average Q in our sample is 6.04, indicating a more significant presence of 
intangibles in this industry compared to the overall economy (Hall et al., 2001 estimate the 
economy-wide Q to be 2).21 
We use the R&D expenditure history of each firm to compute its stock of R&D. The R&D 
stock is constructed using the perpetual inventory method described by Hall (1990). We assume a 
                                                          
17 The database contains information for more than 3 million patents granted from 1976 to 2006; this dictated the 
choice of our sample period.   
18 The data for the market value of equity was obtained from Compustat. Firm’s market value of equity is calculated 
as the price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year.   
19 We adjust all the variables measured in dollars for inflation using the 2015 Consumer Price Index. 
20 Alternative measures are not materially different. Chung and Pruitt (1994) show that the book value of assets has a 
98 percent correlation with alternative measures that have been proposed.  
21 Gleason and Klock (2006) report an average value for Q ratio of 3.6 for the chemicals industry, while Klock and 
Megna (2000) note that the average Q for the wireless communications industry is 10.8.  
depreciation rate (d) of 15 percent and a growth rate (g) of 8 percent.22 Our initial value for R&D 
stock was calculated, using the first available (post-1979) R&D observation, as 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠0 =
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷0/(𝑑𝑑 + 𝑔𝑔). The average value of R&D intensity (R&D stock/Assets) is 2.55, which is 
substantially higher than 0.35 calculated for a cross-industry sample by Hall et al. (2005). This 
illustrates just how significant R&D expenditures are for the firms in our sample.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for U.S.-Based Biopharmaceutical Firms  
Incorporated Between 1980-2006 
Notes: Calculations for all variables, except clinical trials, are based on 349 public biopharmaceutical  
firms in the sample. The numbers reported for clinical trials are derived using observations from 64  
firms. The dollar amounts are in 2015 dollars.  
   
By matching the NBER patent data to the firm-level Compustat data, we construct patent 
and citations stock values using the same perpetual inventory method with the same depreciation 
                                                          
22 Hall (1990, p. 39) shows that the exact choice of depreciation rate does not significantly change the production 
function estimates. Our choice of 15 percent is common in the literature. 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Market value ($mil.) 2,182 446.66 1,125 0.05 17,352 
Book value of assets ($mil.) 2,182 136.00 305.39 0.11 4,696 
Tobin’s Q ratio 2,182 6.04 9.96 0.21 218.25 
R&D stock ($mil.) 2,182 117.83 149.78 0.20 1,675 
Patent stock 2,182 15.29 32.94 0 511.16 
Citation stock 2,182 117.10 155.42 0 1,138 
Organizational capital stock ($mil.) 2,182 11.83 31.42 0 489.05 
Technology alliances stock 2,182 6.18 7.16 0 52.32 
Mergers stock 2,182 0.39 0.94 0 13.50 
Clinical trials stock 483 7.78 7.69 0 47.77 
R&D stock/Assets 2,182 2.55 5.10 0.01 62.20 
Patents/R&D stock 2,182 0.22 0.50 0 9.26 
Citations/Patents 2,182 13.18 22.23 0 275.96 
Organizational capital /Assets 2,182 0.40 2.22 0 46.98 
Technology alliances/Assets 2,182 0.22 0.94 0 24.50 
M&A/Assets 2,182 0.04 0.87 0 33.28 
Clinical trials/ R&D stock 483 0.06 0.06 0 0.33 
and growth rates used to obtain the R&D stock. If any two firms in the sample merged during the 
target period, we combine the information under the surviving firm’s name.  
Patent citations suffer from several potential sources of bias, the most obvious of which is 
truncation. The number of citations for any patent is truncated in time because only citations 
received until the end of the dataset are observed. This concern is more pronounced for more recent 
patents which may be too new to be cited at all. To minimize this truncation problem, we have 
collected additional data from the USPTO and updated the NBER dataset to include all citations 
received through 2016.23 Given that our sample period ends in 2006, we have at least ten years’ 
worth of citation information for each patent in our sample. The ten-year citation profile is 
reasonable considering that most of the citation activity in biopharmaceuticals occurs between the 
fourth and the eighth year of the patent’s life (Hall et al., 2005). Nonetheless, we use the estimated 
parameters for the pharmaceutical industry from Hall et al. (2007) to further correct the observed 
citation rates. Appendix Table A1 reports these parameters. Once we correct the truncation 
problem, we follow the same method used to construct the R&D and patent stock values to 
construct the citation series. 
The firms in our sample are involved in diverse alliances, however in this study we focus 
only on technology alliances as those are the most significant alliances for the innovation process 
(see Chan et al., 1997). To construct the stock of alliances we count the number of alliances that a 
firm entered into in a given year and used the perpetual inventory method as before. We use the 
same method to construct the M&A stock. Recap IQ Deal Builder treats M&A activity as one type 
of alliance. Appendix Table A2 reports the number of new alliances, M&As, patent applications, 
and new firms incorporated in each year during our sample period.  
For the clinical trials data, unfortunately, the Recap IQ Development Optimizer database 
provides data for only a small subsample of firms (64 firms). We collect information on the number 
of phase I, phase II, phase III and phase IV interventional studies per year for each of the firms in 
this subsample. We count the total number of clinical trials initiated in a given year and construct 
the clinical trial stock by applying the same method as with the other intangible stocks.  
Lastly, following Hulten and Hao (2008), we construct a measure for the organizational 
capital stock by applying the perpetual inventory method to a fraction (30 percent) of past SG&A 
                                                          
23 Previous methods to solve truncation problems related to patent citations are found in Hall et al. (2001) and Hall et 
al. (2005).  
expenses.24 Although it is not clear what the appropriate depreciation rates are for this intangible 
asset, for the sake of consistency and for ease of comparison with the other measures, we use a 
depreciation rate of 15 percent. 
Our control variables include a firm’s number of employees, its age, a dummy for patenting 
firms, and year dummies. Because many young biopharmaceutical firms have no revenues to 
report and because their assets are usually intangible, the best measure of firm size in this industry 
is headcount (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). We define a firm’s age as the year of the 
observation minus the year of the IPO plus one. An interaction variable between R&D intensity 
and age is also constructed to measure the impact of R&D intensity on the firm value over time. 
 
IV. Results 
 
Table 2 reports the results from the estimation of various specifications of the market value 
equation, with year dummies, number of employees, firm age, and a dummy for patenting firms 
used as controls. Column 1 displays the baseline estimates for R&D intensity, patent yield, citation 
intensity, and R&D over time, column 2 incorporates the intangible measures that we construct 
(organizational capital, technological alliances, and M&As), column 3 investigates the impact of 
intangibles on the very young firms (in the first six years after their IPO), and lastly, column 4 
reports the results of the model when we control for firm-specific fixed effects.  
The results presented in the first column confirm the importance of R&D, patents, and 
citations in explaining some of the variation in Tobin’s Q. The reported coefficients for these three 
intangibles are statistically significant at the 1 percent, 10 percent, and 5 percent level, respectively. 
The regression results in column 1 also indicate that R&D intensity displays diminishing returns: 
as firms get older, they gain less value from their R&D investments. The interaction term (R&D 
intensity * firm age) is negative and significant at the 5 percent level.25 The regressors of this 
model explain 24.1 percent of the variation in the Q ratio, which is in line with that of many studies 
on this topic (for example, the r-squared ranges between 0.222 and 0.260 for different 
specifications of the same model in Hall et al., 2005).26  
                                                          
24 Hulten and Hao (2008) provide the calculations that justify the 30 percent fraction. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013, 
2014) and Peters and Taylor (2017) use a similar approach to estimate the stock of organizational capital. 
25 This result is consistent with the findings of Gleason and Klock (2006). 
26 Other studies report comparable values for r-squared. Examples include: Baum and Thies (1999) report r-squared 
ranges between 0.125 and 0.225; the r-squared in Gleason and Klock (2006) ranges between 0.117 and 0.281.  
 Table 2: Market Value as a Function of R&D, Patents, Citations Stocks,  
Alliances, Organizational Capital, and M&As, 1980-2006. 
Non-linear Model with Dependent Variable: log Tobin's Q 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
R&D / Assets     
 0.264*** 0.155*** 0.190*** 0.136*** 
 (0.064) (0.052) (0.071) (0.052) 
Patents / R&D      
 0.301* 0.250* 0.304** 0.353 
 (0.155) (0.142) (0.148) (0.248) 
Citations / Patents     
 0.005** 0.004** 0.004* 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Org. capital / Assets     
  1.079*** 1.494*** 0.586** 
  (0.249) (0.343) (0.274) 
Tech. alliances / Assets     
  0.714** 0.557* 1.156** 
  (0.302) (0.296) (0.463) 
M&A / Assets     
  -0.274 -0.164 -1.242*** 
  (0.754) (1.083) (0.382) 
(R&D / Assets) * Age     
 -0.002** -0.002** -0.005*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Employees     
 -0.150* -0.131* -0.502*** 0.354*** 
 (0.079) (0.077) (0.176) (0.137) 
Firm age     
 -0.012 -0.007 -0.013 -0.036*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) 
D (Patents=0)     
 -0.138 0.012 -0.043 -0.950*** 
 (0.086) (0.084) (0.093) (0.246) 
N 2,182 2,182 1,220 2,182 
R2 0.241 0.300 0.375 0.638 
Note: The estimated coefficients on the fixed and time effects are not reported, but are jointly 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are shown in the 
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
In the second variant of our model, we add the additional intangible measures that we 
constructed. The results indicate that in addition to R&D, patents, and citations, both alliance stock 
and organizational capital stock (relative to assets) have positive and highly significant impacts on 
the values of sample firms’ Q. The coefficient for the M&A stock relative to assets, however, is 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels.27 The additional regressors improve the 
performance of the model substantially (explaining 30 percent of the variation in Tobin’s Q) and 
indicate potential misspecification in the first variant of the model. This conclusion is supported 
by the fact that the coefficient for R&D intensity drops significantly (from 0.264 to 0.155) when 
we move from the simpler specification to the complete model (column 2). The coefficient for 
R&D intensity remains fairly stable across the various samples and model specifications for which 
results are presented in columns 2 through 4. 
 Given the acute information asymmetries that are naturally present for very young firms, 
we investigate whether the relationship between Tobin’s Q and our various intangibles holds for 
firms in the first six years after incorporation.28 The results of this specification (reported in column 
3 of Table 2) reveal that these intangibles explain even more of the variation in Tobin’s Q (r-
squared = 0.375). This indicates that the market value of firms early in their life is more reliant on 
changes in these intangible assets as compared to later, in their more mature, years.  
Although column 4 in Table 2 reports the estimates obtained from the model that includes 
firm-specific fixed effects, as Hall et al. (2005) argue, employing fixed firm effects in this context 
is problematic.29 The primary concern comes from the fact that a firm’s various intangible 
measures will be highly correlated with its individual effect since intangible stocks are part of a 
firm’s long-term strategy and, as such, they change very slowly over time. Additionally, in an 
industry where strategic competition between firms is the norm, “the assumption that differences 
across them are ’fixed’ or permanent is not a particularly good one.” (Hall et al., 2005, p. 26). 
Thus, it should be noted that the results in column 4 are not very reliable.  
Comparing the estimated coefficients reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2, we observe 
that patent-related intangibles and our interaction variable (R&D intensity * firm age) are no longer 
statistically significant. Although not reported here, the same outcome is obtained when fixed 
effects are employed in the baseline model (column 1). The stocks of R&D, organizational capital, 
                                                          
27 This result is in line with much empirical research on mergers, which finds that gains from mergers accrue entirely 
to target firm shareholders. For the acquiring-firm shareholders, the gains are either negative or not significantly 
different from zero. For a summary of empirical evidence see Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell et al. (1988), and 
Andrade et al. (2001). 
28 The choice of six years is somewhat arbitrary (half of the 12 years), however the results are very similar to choosing 
other thresholds (four, five, or seven years). 
29 In fact, controlling for unobserved firm-specific fixed effects is very uncommon in this strand of literature. Blundell 
et al. (1999), Bloom and Van Reenen (2002) are prominent exceptions.  
and technology alliances capital (relative to assets) are all positive and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level (R&D is significant at the 1 percent level). The coefficient for M&A/Assets is 
negative and significant at the 1 percent level. It is worth noting that the magnitude of the 
coefficient for organizational capital in column 4 deviates substantially from the estimates reported 
in columns 2 and 3. This is likely a result of the overcorrection we introduce by using fixed firm 
effects.   
Considering the importance of clinical trials in the biopharmaceutical industry, we also 
estimate the model for a subsample of 64 biotechnology firms for which we were able to find 
clinical trials data in the Recap IQ Development Optimizer database. Although we don’t report the 
results of the regression for this subsample (483 observations), all the estimated coefficients have 
the expected sign but they are statistically insignificant at conventional levels.30 This is likely due 
to the small size and the potential selection bias in the sample.31 The fact that this subsample is 
comprised of only “leading” biotech firms makes comparisons with the other sample specifications 
invalid.  
The coefficients for the different control variables have the expected signs. For example, 
in the first three specifications of the model, the size of the firm (measured through the number of 
employees) has a negative influence on its Q value, indicating that, on average, smaller firms have 
a higher Q. This result is statistically significant in all variants of the model and the sign of its 
coefficient in columns 1 to 3 is consistent with the findings of Gleason and Klock (2006) who note 
that firm “size is likely to be inversely related to expected growth opportunities” (p. 308). When 
controlling for fixed firm effects, the coefficient for firm size becomes positive (and significant at 
the 1 percent level), implying that within any given firm an increase in firm size is associated with 
a higher Q, on average. The coefficient on firm age is negative but only statistically significant (at 
the 1 percent level) in the last variation of the model (column 4). This negative relationship is 
likely due to organizational rigidities and rent-seeking according to Loderer and Waelchli (2010).32 
Lastly, the coefficient on the binary variable that identifies patenting firms is not statistically 
significant in models 1 through 3.  
                                                          
30 The positive influence of clinical trials on the market value is also reported by Rzakhanov (2004). 
31 Recap IQ Development Optimizer offers clinical trial data on “leading biotech companies” according to Recap IQ 
Factsheet (http://recap.com/sites/rc/files/pdf/recap-iq-factsheet.pdf) 
32 Loderer and Waelchli (2010) report a highly significant (and robust) negative relationship between firm age and 
profitability for a large sample of cross-industry firms.   
To get an indication of the economic magnitude of the estimated effects, we use the 
coefficients of models 1 and 2 in Table 2 to calculate the quantitative impact of each of the main 
variables on market value. The average values of semi-elasticities and robust standard errors 
clustered by firm are reported in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Computing the Impact of Knowledge Stocks on 
Market Value 
 (1)  (2) 
Ratios    
R&D / Assets 2.549  2.549 
Patents / R&D 0.216  0.216 
Citations / Patents 13.18  13.18 
Organizational capital / Assets   0.398 
Technology Alliances / Assets   0.217 
M&A / Assets   0.041 
    
Marginal Effects (Semi-elasticities)    
𝜕𝜕 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔 𝑄𝑄
𝜕𝜕(𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 / 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ) 0.105***   (0.014)  0.050***  (0.013) 
𝜕𝜕 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔 𝑄𝑄
𝜕𝜕(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 / 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷) 0.120**  0.056  0.081* (0.042) 
𝜕𝜕 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔 𝑄𝑄
𝜕𝜕(𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 / 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) 0.002** (0.001)  0.0012**  (0.0005) 
𝜕𝜕 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔 𝑄𝑄
𝜕𝜕(𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑔𝑔.𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒.  / 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)   0.348***     (0.056) 
𝜕𝜕 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔 𝑄𝑄
𝜕𝜕(𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 / 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)   0.231** (0.091) 
𝜕𝜕 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔 𝑄𝑄
𝜕𝜕(𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴 / 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)   -0.089    (0.244) 
Note: Computed using the estimated coefficients in columns 1 and 2 of Table 
2 evaluated at the mean. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are shown 
in the parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Considering that the average R&D intensity value is 2.55 with a standard deviation of 5.1, 
using model 2 estimates, we can state that firms that are one standard deviation above the mean 
have a market value that is almost 26 percent higher than the average firm. The average semi-
elasticity for the patents yield is even more economically significant: one additional patent per 
million dollars of R&D increases market value by approximately 8 percent. Citations per patent, 
on the other hand, have a much smaller impact on the market value of the firms in our sample 
(semi-elasticity = 0.0012). Indicating just how important investing in organizational capital is for 
the young biopharmaceutical firms, an increase of 10 percentage points in the organizational 
capital stock to assets ratio is associated with an almost 3.5 percent increase in market value. One 
extra technology alliance per ten million dollars of assets increases market value by approximately 
2.3 percent. Lastly, the marginal effect of additional M&As is not significant at the conventional 
levels of significance.  
Several observations are notable from the results in Table 3. First, the quantitative impact 
of R&D in model 2 is half as big as in model 1, indicating the lesser importance of R&D when 
other variables are added. Second, the quantitative impact of patent yield is stronger than the 
impact of R&D on Tobin’s Q. The semi-elasticity for the patent yield is also significantly higher 
than the ones reported by Hall et al. (2005, 2007). This could be because our sample is comprised 
of only young firms, which are likely to have an unproven record of valuable R&D output; 
therefore, early success of R&D for these firms is of utmost importance. Third, the largest impacts 
on Tobin’s Q come from a firm’s investments in organizational capital and the number of 
technology alliances they create.  
V. Conclusion 
 
This paper adds to the literature on market valuation of intangibles by analyzing how the 
innovation process is transformed into value. We report new estimates of the economic value of 
several intangibles, tested jointly, in a sample of young biopharmaceutical firms. Our results 
suggest that in addition to R&D and patents, financial markets recognize the importance of 
alliances and organizational capital. We also provide some evidence on the established result that 
firms typically overpay for acquisitions, which naturally reduces their market value. The inclusion 
of the additional intangibles greatly improves the explanatory power of the model, and changes 
the magnitude of the R&D coefficient, lowering it drastically. Our results also indicate that the 
highest R&D investment returns accrue to firms in their early years, declining as they get older. 
The multiple specifications of the functional form of the valuation equation we consider 
demonstrate the robustness of these results.  
We know high-technology firms generally have poor access to capital since a large fraction 
of their investment is intangible, which serves little or no collateral value (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
The situation is even worse for young firms, which rely more heavily on external funding and 
seldom have any revenue. The estimates reported here serve as quantitative indicators of success 
for these firms, which is key to securing financing. Firms can also use our findings to decide where 
to commit their limited resources, which is an important task in highly competitive environments. 
Estimates of the value of intangibles may also affect competition dynamics at the industry level 
and potentially lead to reshuffling in the form of M&As. Finally, these estimates may serve as a 
guide to policymakers in their assessments of future policy changes as they relate to intangibles.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Weights Implied by Estimated Cumulative  
Lag Distribution for U.S. Patents 
Patent 
Application 
Year 
Lag 
Year 
Citation 
Factor 
2006 10 2.587 
2005 11 2.35 
2004 12 2.155 
2003 13 1.991 
2002 14 1.852 
2001 15 1.732 
2000 16 1.627 
1999 17 1.535 
1998 18 1.454 
1997 19 1.382 
1996 20 1.317 
1995 21 1.258 
1994 22 1.205 
1993 23 1.157 
1992 24 1.112 
1991 25 1.072 
1990 26 1.035 
 ≤    1989 ≥   27 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Firm Activity by Year 
Fiscal 
Year 
Number of 
IPOs 
Number of New 
Patent Applications 
Number of 
New Alliances 
Number of 
Mergers Announced 
1980 3 7 12 0 
1981 2 18 21 0 
1982 5 45 23 0 
1983 7 64 32 0 
1984 9 112 28 0 
1985 14 101 35 0 
1986 9 141 43 0 
1987 9 174 53 0 
1988 16 184 72 0 
1989 11 226 88 2 
1990 27 281 140 4 
1991 22 286 159 7 
1992 22 354 208 9 
1993 15 468 208 8 
1994 16 636 237 15 
1995 34 1,328 225 19 
1996 10 765 292 12 
1997 8 1030 271 23 
1998 38 1,047 270 25 
1999 16 1,129 293 39 
2000 13 1,168 317 40 
2001 15 979 352 27 
2002 11 558 261 24 
2003 12 270 180 29 
2004 3 117 208 21 
2005 2 24 167 29 
2006 0 2 183 21 
Note: These figures are based on a sample of 349 firms used for the estimation of the effects of  
various intangible assets on the value of Tobin’s Q, in the first 12 years after incorporation.  
